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The FAA versus the Magnuson–Moss 
Warranty Act: Which Warrants 
Precedence? 
 
Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration has been an integral part of American jurisprudence since the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925.2 Often described as “a 
speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute resolution,” arbitration has 
become a common alternative to litigation.3 While the FAA and arbitration have 
continued to gain favor, some scholars have argued that adhering to arbitration 
agreements may occasionally produce negative policy, especially when such ad-
herence conflicts with congressional statutes.4 A specific instance of this contro-
versy is whether such adherence conflicts with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 
(MMWA), a federal statute which addresses how consumers may pursue breach of 
warranty claims. In facing these issues, courts are in the unenviable position of 
determining whether the statutes are reconcilable, and if not, which statute war-
rants precedence. 
These questions have proven to be a formidable foe for the judiciary. Moreo-
ver, courts and commentators have been divided as to what answer will produce 
the best policy. In 2002, the discussion seemed to be headed toward conclusion 
after the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits found that the FAA should trump the 
MMWA in the event of statutory conflict. However, with the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, this polarizing issue has once 
again become a focus in American jurisprudence.  While the Ninth Circuit has 
recently withdrawn Kolev sua sponte,5 it is doubtful that the Ninth Circuit is aban-
doning the issue as it has delayed subsequent submissions of Kolev until the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court delivers its decision in Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 
LLC.6 Thus, an understanding of Kolev is vital to grasping both the current and 
future landscape of MMWA arbitrability. This paper asserts that not only is 
 ___________________________  
 1. Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
 3. Joyce J. George, The Advantages of Administered Arbitration When Going It Alone Just Won’t 
Do, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 66, 68 (2002) (noting the cost and time savings arbitration provides as well as 
the ability for parties to structure the process governing their disputes). 
 4. Daniel G. Lloyd, The Magnuson Moss Warranty Act v. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Quin-
tessential Chevron Case, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2003); Katherine R. Guerin, Clash of the 
Federal Titas: The Federal Arbitration Act v. The Magnuson Moss Warranty Act Will The Consumer 
Win or Lose?, 13 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 4, 33 (2001). 
 5. Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 6. Id.; Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, petition for review granted, 272 P.3d 
976 (Cal. 2012).    
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Kolev’s legal reasoning inaccurate, but its policy manifestations would have been 
flawed as well. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Plaintiff Diana Kolev filed suit in the District Court for the Central District of 
California against Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, Motorcars West LLC, HM 
Gray Family II Inc., Gray Family II LLC, Bennett Automotive I Inc., Bennett 
Automotive II Inc. (the Dealership) and Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (Por-
sche) (collectively, the Defendants).7 Upon purchasing the vehicle from the Deal-
ership, Kolev signed a formal sales contract with the Dealership, agreeing to arbi-
trate certain disputes arising from the transaction.8 In her complaint, Kolev alleged 
breach of implied and express warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 
(MMWA)9 and breach of contract and unconscionability under California’s Con-
sumer Warranty Act10 and California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act.11 Kolev 
argued that both the Dealership and the manufacturer, Porsche, sold her a “certi-
fied” used car that was not eligible to be certified; she experienced various prob-
lems that should have been covered under the original factory warranty; and both 
Porsche and the dealer refused to repair them.12 Additionally, Kolev argued the 
contract was substantively unconscionable because arbitration fees of at least 
$15,000 exceeded the cost of litigation and she could not afford to pay those 
fees.13 Kolev also alleged several other substantive defects in the sales contract, 
including: 1) an impermissible class action waiver, 2) a clause imposing all costs 
of arbitration on Kolev should she lose, 3) a one-sided appeal provision favoring 
the Defendants, 4) no provision providing Kolev with a waiver of fees, and 5) a 
provision allowing the dealership to litigate claims it was most likely to bring 
while compelling Kolev to pursue claims she was most likely to bring in arbitra-
tion.14  
Responding to Kolev’s complaint, the Defendants filed a petition to compel 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the original sales contract, and also 
filed a motion to stay the action against Porsche.15 Kolev opposed the motion to 
compel, arguing that the sales contract was procedurally unconscionable because 
it was one of adhesion between two parties of unequal bargaining power and be-
cause the arbitration agreement was light in print and hidden.16 Kolev objected to 
 ___________________________  
 7. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1025.  
 8. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, Kolev, 658 F.3d 1024 (No. 09-55963). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2006). 
 10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794 (2011). 
 11. Id. § 1750.  
 12. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
 13. Id. at 5; Appellee’s Response Brief at 11, Kolev, 658 F.3d 1024 (No. 09-55963).  Defendants 
argued that: 1) Kolev’s actual filing fees would be only a couple hundred dollars and both the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA) and the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) require the Defendants 
in this action to pay all fees incurred beyond the initial filing fee; and 2) both the AAA and California 
law allowed Kolev to exercise a waiver of fees as well as prevent an arbitrator from awarding costs to 
a defendant should the complainant lose. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(a), (b) (2011). 
 14. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 5. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.; see also Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 13, at 4-16. Defendants argued that: 1) the 
sales contract at issue was not an adhesion contract but a form contract whose provisions were nego-
 
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2012/iss2/10
File: Beckerle 10.30 Created on: 10/30/2012 12:28:00 PM Last Printed: 6/12/2013 6:50:00 PM 
No. 2] The FAA versus the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act 647 
 
the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, arguing that her claims for injunc-
tive relief and other claims alleged under the MMWA were not arbitrable as a 
matter of law.17 Finally, Kolev argued that the motion to compel should be denied 
because the Defendants had failed to show that she ever agreed to arbitrate any 
dispute.18 
The district court granted Kolev’s claim for injunctive relief and stayed the 
litigation against Porsche, but denied Kolev’s other objections and granted De-
fendants’ motion to compel arbitration on all other claims.19 An arbitrator awarded 
Kolev some substantive relief20 but resolved all other claims in favor of the De-
fendants.21  
Kolev appealed the court order confirming the arbitration award to the Ninth 
Circuit, alleging the aforementioned flaws in the district court’s grant of the De-
fendant’s motion to compel arbitration, as well as novel allegations of flaws in the 
arbitrator’s decision-making.22 In evaluating the case, the Ninth Circuit focused 
almost exclusively on Kolev’s assertion that the MMWA barred arbitration of her 
complaint and held that written warranty provisions that mandate pre-dispute 
binding arbitration of consumer claims are invalid under the MMWA.23 The court 
cited Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulation 703,24 which the court inter-
preted as barring arbitration of MMWA claims.25 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that because Congress had not specifically addressed the issue before the 
court and the FTC regulation was reasonable, the court should show deference to 
the FTC.26 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the 
district court.27 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 
In 1975, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) to 
address widespread exploitation of express warranties and disclaimers by mer-
 ___________________________  
tiable, and 2) the arbitration provisions contained in the contract were not hidden but were in bold, 
easy to find, and accessible to Kolev at the time of purchase. Id. at 7-8. 
 17. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 6. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 20. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 6-7. The arbitrator ordered the Defendants to change 
the springs on the vehicle back to factory springs.  Id. 
 21. Id. at 6. 
 22. Id. at 7-8. Kolev argued that the arbitrator improperly found Defendants had not violated Cali-
fornia’s Consumer Warranty Act because the arbitrator improperly found that intent was necessary for 
culpability under the Act. Id. at 7. 
 23. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1031 (“[W]e need not address Kolev's additional contentions that the arbitra-
tion clause was unconscionable under California law and that the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting and relying on the sales contract authenticated by a principal of the Dealership and by com-
pelling arbitration of her claims against the Dealership while staying the action against Porsche.”) 
 24. FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.1 (2009). 
 25. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1026. 
 26. Id. at 1026-31. 
 27. Id. at 1031.  
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chants.28 The Act requires sellers using written express warranties as advertising 
and merchandising devices to meet federal standards that guarantee certain reme-
dies be provided to aggrieved consumers.29  To prevail in an action brought under 
the MMWA,  the consumer bears the burden of establishing that the damages 
resulted from the supplier, warrantor, or service contractor’s failure to adhere to 
provisions of the written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract.30 The 
MMWA encourages warrantors to establish procedures for consumers’ disputes so 
that they may be fairly and expeditiously settled through “informal dispute settle-
ment mechanisms.”31 In establishing the MMWA, Congress expressly delegated 
rulemaking authority under the statute to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).32  
In finding that the MMWA did not specifically address the validity of pre-
dispute binding arbitration, the Kolev court looked to the landmark Supreme Court 
case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.33 to 
discern whether requiring such arbitration was permissible.34 
B. Agency Deference 
In Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court faced the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977, which imposed national air quality standards, vis-à-vis the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), on states that had not yet enacted air quality regula-
tions.35 The legislation required such states to establish a permit program regulat-
ing “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution.36 The EPA later 
amended the Clean Air Act to allow an existing plant to get permits for new 
equipment that did not meet standards, as long as the total emissions from the 
plant itself did not increase.37 In response, the plaintiff, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, filed suit against the EPA claiming its Clean Air Act was contra-
ry to other EPA legislation, and therefore impermissible.38 The issue before the 
Court became whether to grant deference to a government agency's (in this in-
stance, the EPA’s) construction of a statute which it administers.39 
 The Court began by noting that the amended Clean Air Act originally did not 
expressly define “stationary source,” nor was there any legislative history to shed 
light on the phrase.40 Therefore, uncertainty existed as to which entities the permit 
program should apply.41 To decide the issue, the Court created a two prong test.42 
First, the Court looked to “whether Congress [had] directly spoken to the precise 
 ___________________________  
 28. 59 A.L.R. FED. 461, § 2(a) (1982). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (2006). 
 32. See id. § 2310(a)(2). 
 33. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 34. Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 35. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 2778-79. 
 36. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (2006). 
 37. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 2780.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 2781, 2786. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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question at issue.”43 If Congress had done so, then the analysis would end and 
effect must be given to the clearly expressed intent of Congress.44 However, if 
Congress had not addressed the question at issue, and an administrative interpreta-
tion did address the issue, the Court would then ask whether the administrative 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.45  
Applying this test, the Supreme Court ultimately denied the plaintiff’s com-
plaint, finding that the statute did not expressly define “stationary source,” that the 
EPA’s interpretation of such was permissible, and, therefore, that deference 
should be given to the EPA’s statutory construction.46 After nearly three decades, 
the two-step process developed in Chevron is still the applicable test for evaluat-
ing administrative interpretations and the case is widely considered the harbinger 
for the Supreme Court’s approach to deference.47  
While Chevron resolved the issue of how courts should approach administra-
tive regulations, it did so in a vacuum; that is, its holding is dispositive only when 
the administrative regulation is the sole issue before the court.48  
C. When the MMWA and FAA Conflict 
A more complex issue for courts has arisen when the proper exercise of ad-
ministrative deference or adherence to the principles of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) would yield conflicting holdings.49 The Fifth Circuit addressed such a 
conflict in Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC.50 In Walton, the plaintiffs, the 
Waltons, purchased a mobile home manufactured by the defendant, Southern En-
ergy Homes, Inc. from the seller-defendant, Rose Mobile Homes.51 Southern En-
ergy issued the Waltons a one-year manufacturer's warranty against defects in 
materials and workmanship.52 The warranty contained an arbitration provision 
requiring the Waltons to submit any claims under the warranty to binding arbitra-
tion.53 After finding several defects in their newly purchased home, the Waltons 
demanded that the defects be fixed.54 However, the repairs were never completed 
to the Waltons’ satisfaction.55 The Waltons’ dissatisfaction led them to file suit in 
the Circuit Court of Kemper County, Mississippi, alleging infringement of the 
 ___________________________  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 2782. 
 46. Id. at 2793.  
 47. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 
969, 971 (1992). 
 48. See Chevron, 467 U.S at 2778-82. 
 49. Gary B. Born & Adam Raviv, Arbitration Agreement Versus Agency Deference, Kluwer Law 
International, http://kluwer.practicesource.com/blog/2012/arbitration-agreements-versus-agency-
deference/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (“If a federal agency reads an ambiguous statute as allowing it to 
prohibit arbitration, should that interpretation be granted the normal deference afforded agencies under 
Chevron?”). 
 50. 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 51. Id. at 471. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 472. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, among other violations.56 In response to the suit, 
the defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration of the Waltons’ claims.57 The 
district court denied the defendants’ motion, finding that the MMWA precluded 
the defendants from requiring the Waltons to submit their written warranty claims 
to binding arbitration.58 The defendants timely appealed the circuit court’s order.59 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that 
as a result of a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the FAA as establishing a “presumption in favor of the enforceability 
of contractual arbitration agreements.”60 The court stated that the party seeking to 
avoid arbitration must exhibit  Congress’ intent to proscribe a “waiver of judicial 
remedies for the statutory rights at issue” in order to circumvent arbitration and 
litigate their claims.61 In determining whether Congress intended such preclusion, 
the Fifth Circuit employed the McMahon test,62 which relies on three factors to 
determine Congress’ intent in enacting a statute: 1) the statute's text; 2) its legisla-
tive history; and 3) whether there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and 
the statute's underlying purposes.63  
The court then turned to the issue of whether the Waltons had met their bur-
den.64 Evaluating the text of the statute, the Fifth Circuit found that the MMWA 
“permits warrantors to establish ‘informal dispute settlement procedures’ for 
breach of written warranty claims and to require consumers to resort to such pro-
cedures before bringing a civil action.”65 Noting that the term “informal dispute 
settlement procedure” was not defined anywhere in the text of the Act, the court 
noted that the FTC is instructed to “prescribe rules setting forth minimum re-
quirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated 
into the terms of a written warranty.”66 Reviewing the FTC regulation, the court 
noted that informal dispute settlement procedures under the MMWA are not legal-
ly binding, and therefore, written warranties cannot confine consumer redress to 
binding arbitration.67  
 ___________________________  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 473. 
 60. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)). 
 61. Id.  
 62. Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding that the Arbitra-
tion Act establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration, requiring that the courts rigorously enforce 
arbitration agreements). The Court stated, in relevant part: 
 
This duty . . . is not diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on 
statutory rights . . . . [T]he . . . Act's mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional 
command . . . [but] the burden is on the party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress in-
tended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue . . . . [S]uch intent 
may be discernible from the statute's text, history, or purposes.  
 
Id. at 226-27. 
 63. Id. at 227; Walton, 298 F.3d at 474. 
 64. Walton, 298 F.3d at 474. 
 65. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (2006). 
 66. Walton, 298 F.3d at 474-75; 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2). 
 67. Walton, 298 F.3d at 474-75 (“[T]here is nothing in the Rule which precludes the use of any other 
remedies by the parties following a Mechanism decision . . . . However, reference within the written 
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Having ascertained the FTC’s stance on arbitrability of warranty claims, the 
Fifth Circuit turned its attention to the two-prong Chevron test to determine 
whether deference should be given to the FTC promulgation.68 The court’s analy-
sis ended after the first prong of Chevron when it found that Congress expressed 
clear intent in favor of arbitration of contractual claims.69 Therefore, the FTC’s 
regulation was moot.70  
Finding that Congress had directly spoken to the issue of arbitrability of con-
sumer claims,71 the Fifth Circuit found the FTC regulation failed the first prong of 
Chevron72 and reversed the district court’s holding, granting the defendants’ mo-
tion to compel arbitration.73  
This interaction between the FTC’s regulation (which bars mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions in warranty contracts) and Congress’ support of the FAA (which 
favors arbitration) was also reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Southern 
Energy Homes, Inc.74 With facts almost identical to those in Walton, Davis in-
volved plaintiffs who, after purchasing their mobile home from defendant South-
ern Energy Homes, found several defects with the new home.75 The plaintiffs filed 
suit alleging, among other infringements, violation of the MMWA.76 In response, 
the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the binding arbitra-
tion agreement contained in the manufactured home's written warranty.77 
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by evaluating the text of the MMWA 
and finding that while the MMWA did not define “informal dispute settlement 
procedure,” it did provide that if a warrantor incorporates an informal dispute 
settlement procedure into the warranty, the provision needed to comply with the 
minimum requirements prescribed by the FTC.78 The court proceeded to evaluate 
the FAA and its provisions, noting that if a party has signed an arbitration agree-
ment,  
the party should be held to [the agreement] unless Congress itself has 
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the 
statutory rights at issue . . . . Thus, unless Congress has clearly expressed 
an intention to preclude arbitration of the statutory claim, a party is 
bound by its agreement to arbitrate.79  
Like the Walton court, the Eleventh Circuit then turned to the McMahon test 
to determine whether Congress intended to preclude arbitration of MMWA 
 ___________________________  
warranty to any binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the Act.”); FTC Informal 
Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. 703.3 (2009). 
 68. Walton, 298 F.3d. at 475. 
 69. Id.; see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  
 70. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 71. Walton, 298 F.3d at 475 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 478. 
 74. 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).  
 75. Id. at 1270. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1272; 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (2006). 
 79. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
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claims.80 First, the Eleventh Circuit found that the text of the MMWA did not 
expressly proscribe arbitration.81 Second, legislative history regarding the 
MMWA also failed to address arbitration and was ambiguous at best on the top-
ic.82 Finally, under the McMahon test, the court found that none of the three pur-
poses of the MMWA conflicted with that of the FAA.83 Thus, the court concluded 
that the plaintiffs had failed to show discernible congressional intent to bar the 
arbitrability of MMWA claims.84  
Having found that the McMahon test did not bar arbitration, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, as the Fifth Circuit did in Walton, subsequently turned to the Chevron test to 
determine whether the FTC’s regulation barred arbitration of MMWA claims.85 At 
this point the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ reasoning parted ways. While the Wal-
ton court found that Congress had expressed a clear intention favoring arbitrability 
of MMWA claims, the Eleventh Circuit found that Congress had not expressed 
any clear intent on the issue.86 Thus, while the Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
FTC’s regulation failed Chevron’s initial prong, the Eleventh Circuit decided the 
regulation survived.87  
However, this distinction in reasoning did not cause opposing outcomes, be-
cause the Davis court found that the FTC regulation was unreasonable and, there-
fore, failed the second prong of the Chevron test.88 The Eleventh Circuit found the 
FTC regulation barring arbitration of MMWA claims to be unreasonable because 
it conflicted with Supreme Court jurisprudence favoring arbitration, and therefore 
was not entitled to judicial deference.89 Finding both that the FTC regulation bar-
ring arbitration of MMWA claims was unreasonable under the Chevron test and a 
lack of any Congressional intent to bar arbitration of MMWA claims under the 
McMahon test, the Davis court ultimately agreed with the Fifth Circuit and like-
wise granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.90 
While determining the proper interaction between the MMWA, FAA, Chev-
ron, and McMahon has not been easy for courts, it did appear that the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits had resolved the issue and established firm pro-arbitration prec-
edence regarding the MMWA.91 Given that Walton and Davis not only reached 
the same conclusion but that each case did so in a similar manner seemed to have 
 ___________________________  
 80. Id.; see also Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987). The 
McMahon opinion spelled out the following sources of authority: 1) the statute's text; 2) its legislative 
history; and 3) whether there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying 
purposes. Id. 
 81. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1274.  
 82. Id. at 1275-76. 
 83. Id. at 1276 (“The MMWA expressly states three purposes: ‘to improve the adequacy of infor-
mation available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of con-
sumer products.’ These purposes are not in conflict with the FAA. In fact, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly enforced arbitration of statutory claims where the underlying purpose of the statutes is to 
protect and inform consumers.”); 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 
 84. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1277. 
 85. See supra note 67. 
 86. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1278. 
 87. Id.; Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 88. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1280. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. See generally Walton, 298 F.3d 470; Davis, 305 F.3d 1268. 
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put the issue to rest. However, a decade later the Ninth Circuit and Kolev have 
seemingly revived the issue. 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
A. Majority Opinion 
The U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit began its analysis in Kolev by 
stating that while the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) does not specifi-
cally address arbitration, Congress had delegated rulemaking authority under the 
Act to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).92 The court further noted that the 
FTC, pursuant to its rulemaking authority, construed the MMWA as proscribing 
mandatory arbitration of claims brought under the Act.93 Finding the MMWA 
ambiguous on the issue and the FTC regulation on point, the court invoked the 
Chevron test to determine whether deference should be granted to the administra-
tive promulgation.94 
Addressing the initial prong of Chevron, the court, citing Walton and Davis, 
noted that both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits agreed Congress had not manifest-
ed an express intent over whether MMWA claims were arbitrable.95 Finding that 
the regulation passed the first prong, the court subsequently turned to the second 
prong of Chevron to determine whether the regulation was reasonable.96 In ad-
dressing this issue, the Kolev court cited to various provisions of the FTC promul-
gation constructing a framework whereby mechanisms under the MMWA are 
“informal dispute settlement procedure[s] which [are] incorporated into the terms 
of a written warranty,”97 and that such mechanisms, including arbitration, are not 
binding on the consumer and do not prevent the consumer from pursuing other 
legal remedies such as litigation.98 In evaluating whether the FTC regulation was a 
reasonable construction of the MMWA, the court noted the FTC’s explanation, 
purporting that Congress’ intent was to bar arbitration of MMWA claims.99 Addi-
tionally, the FTC asserted that even if Congress had intended to allow arbitration 
of such claims, the FTC was not prepared to set out guidelines to address such a 
system.100  
The Ninth Circuit found the FTC explanation persuasive for three reasons.101 
First, at least according to the FTC advisory note, the regulation was promulgated 
in accordance with Congress’ intent to bar arbitration under the MMWA.102 Sec-
ond, the court stated that in enacting the MMWA, Congress sought to address the 
inequality in bargaining power between merchants and consumers by providing 
 ___________________________  
 92. Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion 
withdrawn, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (2006). 
 93. Id.; FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.1, 703.5 (2009). 
 94. Kolev, 658 F.3d  at 1025-27. 
 95. Id. at 1026 (citing Walton, 298 F.3d at 475; Davis, 305 F.3d at 1278). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (citing FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.1(e)). 
 98. Id. (citing FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(g)(1)). 
 99. Id. (citing FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3)). 
 100. Id. at 1026-27. 
 101. Id. at 1027. 
 102. Id.  
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consumers with access to more reasonable and effective remedies.103 Barring 
mandatory binding arbitration furthers that aim because it protects consumers 
from being forced into involuntary agreements they cannot negotiate.104 Third, the 
court found that, according to Supreme Court precedent, the thirty-five year old 
regulations warranted deference because they represented a longstanding, con-
sistent interpretation of the statute.105 Determining that the FTC regulations bar-
ring mandatory arbitration of consumer contracts were reasonable, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that deference to the regulation should be shown.106  After resolv-
ing this issue, the Ninth Circuit immediately turned its attention to addressing 
possible attacks on its reasoning.107  
In dicta, the Kolev court acknowledged the current Supreme Court’s stance 
favoring a liberal policy of arbitration, but cited the McMahon test for the proposi-
tion that agreements to arbitrate may be overridden by contrary congressional 
command.108 Applying this test, the court explained why the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits erred in holding that Congress had not expressed intent to bar mandatory 
arbitration of MMWA claims.109 Addressing the Walton decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit claimed it was unprecedented to discern Congress’ intent for one statute, the 
MMWA, by looking at another previous statute, the FAA.110 With respect to the 
Davis decision, the Ninth Circuit explained that the FTC regulation was reasona-
ble for the aforementioned reasons,111 but also because the FTC regulation dif-
fered from other administrative regulations which had failed to rebut the FAA’s 
pro-arbitration assumption.112 
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling to compel 
arbitration and remanded the case back to the district court, holding that mandato-
ry arbitration provisions are invalid under the MMWA.113 
 ___________________________  
 103. Id. (citing H.R.REP. No. 93–1107, at 24 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7702). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1028 (citing Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 490 (5th Cir. 2002)  
(King, C.J., dissenting); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996) (“A court may accord great 
weight to the longstanding interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged with its administra-
tion . . . [because] agency interpretations that are of long standing come before us with a certain cre-
dential of reasonableness, since it is rare that error would long persist.”). 
 106. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1029. 
 107. See id. at 1029-31. 
 108. Id. at 1029; see generally Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 (1987). The FAA's mandate to 
enforce arbitration agreements, “[l]ike any statutory directive, may be overridden by a contrary con-
gressional command.” Id. 
 109. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1029. 
 110. Id. (citing Walton, 298 F.3d at 483 (King, C.J., dissenting)). 
 111. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. 
 112. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1030-31. The court supported its conclusion with the following reasons: 1) 
“in none [of the rejected statutes] did an authorized agency construe the statute to bar pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration”; 2) none of the rejected statutes had Congressional language relating to possibly 
barring mandatory arbitration whereas the MMWA does; and 3) Congress, in the MMWA, “explicitly 
preserve[d]” a consumer’s right to pursue statutory claims in a judicial setting. Id. at 1030. See gener-
ally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that the 
Sherman Antitrust Act invalidly conflicts with the FAA); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-38 (holding that 
the Securities Exchange Act invalidly conflicts with the FAA); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp, 500 U.S. 20, 26-35 (1991) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act invalidly 
conflicts with the FAA). 
 113. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1031. 
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B. Judge Smith’s Dissent 
In his dissent, Judge Smith criticized the majority for misconstruing the FTC 
regulation and ignoring precedent.114 Addressing the alleged flaws in the majori-
ty’s statutory interpretation, Judge Smith cited FTC promulgations to bolster his 
argument, first noting that Congress made informal dispute resolution procedures, 
or mechanisms, a prerequisite to filing suit to encourage expeditious resolution of 
claims under the MMWA.115 Second, Judge Smith asserted that the arbitration 
remedy at issue was not a mechanism in accordance with the FTC regulations 
because the arbitration agreement is an alternative, not a prerequisite, to litiga-
tion.116 Third, Judge Smith stated that while the majority was correct in finding 
that the FTC regulation disapproves of binding non-judicial remedies in written 
warranties, the regulation only pertains to warranties that incorporate one of the 
defined mechanisms.117 Expounding on his second point, Judge Smith found that 
because the arbitration agreement at issue was not a mechanism as defined by the 
FTC, it was outside the purview of the FTC regulations.118 
The dissent then turned its attention to the majority’s second holding: Chev-
ron deference was appropriate in this case.119 First, Smith argued the Chevron test 
was inappropriate because Congress never delegated authority to the FTC to regu-
late non-judicial remedies unless those remedies qualified as mechanisms.120 Hav-
ing found that the arbitration agreement at issue was not such a mechanism, Judge 
Smith stated that Congress delegated no authority to the FTC concerning the mat-
ter at issue and deference was patently incorrect.121  
Finally, Judge Smith found that even if the FTC had the authority to regulate 
the arbitration agreement in this instance, and such regulations could be construed 
to bar that arbitration, it would be unreasonable to do so in light of contemporary 
principles and approaches to the FAA.122 To find otherwise would create an un-
necessary conflict between the federal circuits as well as between the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the Supreme Court.123 
 ___________________________  
 114. Id. at 1031-32 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id.; Final Action Concerning Review of Interpretations of MMWA, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,701 
(Apr. 22, 1999) 
 116. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1031-32. (“The Agreement provides that (1) disputes will ‘be resolved by 
neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action;’ (2) ‘[t]he arbitrator's award shall be final and 
binding on all parties’; and (3) ‘any appeal, if permitted by the terms of the agreement, will be to a 
three-arbitrator panel, not to a court of law.’”); see 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (2006). 
 117. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1035. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. (quoting Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650  (1990) (“[A]n agency may not 
bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction . . . .”) (citations omitted)). 
 121. Id. at 1036 (citing Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 650). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1031 (“In a departure from Supreme Court precedent, the prevailing view of our sister 
circuits, and applicable statutes, the majority opinion nullifies nearly every binding, non-judicial war-
ranty dispute remedy adopted by private parties in this circuit.”). 
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V. COMMENT 
A. The Ninth Circuit Incorrectly Decided Kolev 
The Ninth Circuit erred in four ways in reaching its decision that the MMWA 
bars mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. First, the court was incorrect in applying 
the Chevron test because the FTC promulgation did not apply to the mandatory 
arbitration agreement at issue.  Second, even if the FTC promulgation applied to 
the arbitration agreement, the FTC did not have the required statutory authority to 
make its promulgation. Third, even if it was proper to apply the Chevron test, the 
facts of the case should not survive the Chevron test because Congress has spoken 
directly on the issue via the FAA. Finally, even if the FTC had the requisite statu-
tory authority to make its promulgation, the promulgation is not a permissible 
interpretation of the MMWA because it conflicts both with the MMWA itself and 
Supreme Court precedent. 
The most severe flaw in Kolev was the Ninth Circuit finding that the FTC 
regulation survived the Chevron test.124 The MMWA “encourage[s] warrantors to 
establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expeditiously set-
tled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms.”125 The MMWA also dele-
gates to the FTC the power to determine minimum requirements for such mecha-
nisms.126 At first glance, this would seem to afford the FTC the grounds with 
which to make its promulgation barring pre-dispute binding arbitration. However, 
the Ninth Circuit overlooked a congressional regulation accompanying the 
MMWA stating that nothing in the Act prevents parties from agreeing to some 
other avenue of redress other than a mechanism, if they choose to do so.127 The 
regulation also explicitly states that such avenues of redress include binding arbi-
tration.128 The Kolev court was further misled by MMWA language stating a 
“consumer [may] resort to such [informal dispute mechanism] procedure before 
pursuing any legal remedy.”129 The Ninth Circuit interprets this language to allow 
plaintiffs to first pursue an informal dispute mechanism, such as arbitration, and 
then later pursue litigation. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning misconstrues the 
purpose of arbitration: it is an alternative to judicial proceedings, not a segue to 
them.130 It may have been this policy pitfall that encouraged Congress to supple-
ment the MMWA with a regulation reserving the right to binding arbitration, but 
regardless of Congress’ motive for the regulation, it explicitly announced that 
binding arbitration is not a mechanism but a procedure available under the 
MMWA.131 For this reason, the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the Chevron test 
and, therefore, should have affirmed the district court’s order to compel arbitra-
tion.  
 ___________________________  
 124. Born & Raviv, supra note 49.  
 125. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (2006). 
 126. Id. § 2310(a)(2). 
 127. FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3 (2009). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1030 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(C)). 
 130. Born & Raviv, supra note 49. 
 131. FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3; Born & Raviv, supra note 49.  
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The Ninth Circuit was also incorrect in evaluating whether the FTC promul-
gation warranted judicial deference in accordance with the Chevron test because 
the FTC never had the authority to make its promulgation in the first place. Con-
gress did not delegate to the FTC the power to regulate all alternative dispute reso-
lution avenues; it only empowered the FTC to regulate mechanisms.132 As the 
dissent accurately noted, the arbitration remedy at issue in Kolev was not a mech-
anism as defined by the MMWA and was, therefore, outside the purview of the 
FTC’s control.133 Thus, Congress never delegated to the FTC the power to control 
the arbitration provision at issue and applying the Chevron test was error.134 
In finding that Congress had not spoken directly on the issue of binding arbi-
tration in accordance with step one of the Chevron test, the Kolev court over-
looked the most obvious example of congressional intent, the FAA.135 The Ninth 
Circuit was correct in noting that the MMWA, at least on its face, does not specif-
ically address its stance on binding arbitration.136 However, even in the absence of 
a federal regulation allowing or proscribing binding arbitration, the court should 
have acknowledged the FAA as evincing Congress’ intent to permit binding arbi-
tration.137 Thus, Kolev’s conclusion that the FTC regulation survived the Chevron 
test is misguided. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit erred in finding that the FTC’s regulation was a 
permissible construction of the MMWA. Not only does the regulation directly 
conflict with the FAA but it also flies in the face of recent Supreme Court prece-
dent which has repeatedly taken a liberal approach to arbitration.138 While the 
inaccurate resolution of complex legal issues such as the determination of agency 
deference and the construction of an ineptly written statute are understandable 
missteps, it is still hard to imagine how the Ninth Circuit could deliver an opinion 
so antithetical to Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
B. The Implications of Kolev 
1. The Difficulty in Determining Whether                                           
MMWA Claims May Be Arbitrated 
While the Kolev court was misguided in its reasoning, it is certainly not the 
only culprit. Congress’ initial failure to properly define “mechanisms” left a major 
unresolved question in the application of the MMWA. The difficulty courts faced 
in resolving this issue increased exponentially with a legislative promulgation that 
 ___________________________  
 132. FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3; Born & Raviv, supra note 49. 
 133. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1033 (Smith, J., dissenting); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(B). 
 134. Born & Raviv, supra note 49. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3. 
 137. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1026; Born & Raviv, supra note 49. 
 138. Born & Raviv, supra note 49; Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 
(1987). If a party wants to show that another federal law limits the pro-arbitration scope of the FAA, 
“[t]he burden is on the party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress intended to preclude a 
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” Id. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639 n.21 (1985) (noting that courts should recognize “subject-
matter exceptions” to arbitrability only where Congress has “expressly directed the courts to do so”). 
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advocated arbitration of MMWA claims as a prerequisite to litigation.139 The issue 
with this is that one of the central features of arbitration is that it is a final award; 
it is by nature an alternative to the judicial process, not a precursor.140 This lan-
guage has “muddied the waters” and made MMWA analysis under the McMahon 
or Chevron tests very difficult for courts.141  
Although the means used by the Ninth Circuit in Kolev appear flawed, ques-
tions over whether its end propagates good policy represent a more controversial 
topic.142 Critics expounding on Kolev’s possible policy implications tend to fall 
into one of two factions: those who argue that the FAA should rule and MMWA 
claims should be arbitrable, and those who argue that consumer protection should 
rule and MMWA claims should not be arbitrable.143 
The leaders of the pro-arbitrability sentiment have argued that the United 
States, as a signatory to the New York Convention144 and other international arbi-
tration conventions,145 should be committed to recognizing and upholding arbitra-
tion agreements.146 Allowing courts to defeat arbitration via contrary administra-
tive regulations does not instill trust in other signatory countries which expect 
arbitration agreements to be honored.147 Moreover, tainting the integrity of arbitra-
tion in the U.S. could have a substantial adverse effect on foreign investment and 
wealth creation.148 Consistent enforcement of agreements to arbitrate provides 
assurance to investors from signatory countries that disputes arising from their 
transactions will be resolved by arbitration. Resolving issues through a transna-
tional procedure like arbitration, with rules influenced by each signatory nation, 
establishes perceptions of fairness and reliability, thus reducing investors’ risks 
 ___________________________  
 139. H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 41 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7723 (“An adverse 
decision in any informal dispute settlement proceeding would not be a bar to a civil action on the 
warranty involved in the proceeding.”); see Higgs v. The Warranty Group, No. C2-02-1092, 2007 WL 
2034376 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2007); Rickard v. Teynor's Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Ohio 
2003); Browne v. Kine Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Va. 2002); Koons Ford of 
Baltimore, Inc. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722 (Md. 2007); Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 
S.E.2d 663 (S.C. 2007); Tucker v. Ford Motor Co., CL-2006-2827, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 24 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. Feb. 1, 2007). 
 140. Born & Raviv, supra note 49. 
 141. See generally Kolev, 658 F.3d 1024; Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 
(11th Cir. 2002); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Boyd v. 
Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1437 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (“[Section] 2310 sets up alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms or procedures, akin to arbitration, which consumers may be compelled 
to exhaust before resorting to a court lawsuit.”). 
 142. See Daniel G. Lloyd, The Magnuson Moss Warranty Act v. The Federal Arbitration Act: The 
Quintessential Chevron Case, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2003); but see Born & Raviv, supra note 
49. 
 143. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. 
 144. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 145. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Jan. 10, 2011), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-
2010-e.pdf; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, Pub. L. No. 
101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990). 
 146. Born & Raviv, supra note 49. 
 147. Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA 
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 366 (2003). 
 148. Id. at 396 (“In today's heterogeneous world, cross-border investment will be chilled without a 
willingness of all countries to accept arbitration.”). 
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and increasing capital flow.149 Conversely, litigation is controlled by a set of rules 
enacted solely by the situs’ government, creating distrust as foreign litigants fear 
nationalist and ethnocentric biases.150 
Arguments by those who oppose arbitrability of MMWA claims contend that 
consumers would be exploited if warrantors could compel arbitration.151 Specifi-
cally, this constituency alleges that consumers frequently have bargaining power 
inferior to that of their warrantor; therefore, it is not realistic for consumers to 
bargain whether or not they will enter into an arbitration agreement and what the 
provisions of that agreement will be.152 By allowing warrantors to dominate the 
terms and availability of arbitration, consumers may easily be exploited. For ex-
ample, initial arbitration expenses and attorneys’ fees may deter aggrieved con-
sumers from bringing successful claims and receiving compensation.153 Addition-
ally, by compelling arbitration, warrantors will often be able to avoid larger pay-
outs to aggrieved consumers.154 This second problem for consumers may be fur-
ther exacerbated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a recent Supreme Court 
decision permitting warrantors to implement class action waivers in arbitration.155  
Both factions present compelling arguments and articulate the various dan-
gers that could result from siding against them. The concerns raised by this prob-
lem have prompted courts, commentators, and legislators to address the issue.156 
Unfortunately, attempts to resolve the issue have fallen short. Taking an econo-
mist’s approach to the issue, this note argues that MMWA claims should be arbi-
 ___________________________  
 149. See id. at 366-69. 
 150. See id. at 369-70. 
 151. Guerin, supra note 4, at 20-21; Mace E. Gunter, Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The Mag-
nuson-Moss Warranty Act and Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REV. 1483, 
1508-09 (2000); Lloyd, supra note 4, at 1. Lloyd describes this preference: 
 
Creditors and merchants prefer the arbitral forum due to the lower likelihood of exposure to large 
judgments, even in the wake of systematic misconduct. Additional reasons, perhaps equally as 
compelling, include losing the right to a jury, the unavailability of pursuing a class action, dis-
covery limitations, filing fees, and the inability to appeal an erroneous interpretation of law–all 
hindering the consumer's pursuit of redress. One commentator even dubbed arbitration the ‘death 
knell’ of consumer protection. Currently, the effort to avoid arbitration in a consumer setting is 
one of the most frequently contested issues. 
 
Id. 
 152. Guerin, supra note 4, at 4 (“The seller's boilerplate language becomes more like boilerplate 
armor, skillfully crafted by legal counsel. In contrast, the consumer has no negotiation rights and 
consequently, has no choice—the ‘take it or leave it’ theory—but to sign ‘on the dotted line’ and hope 
to be satisfied with the product.”). 
 153. Allan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause: Drafting and Imple-
mentation Issues Which Should Be Considered By a Consumer Lender, 1113 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. L. 
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK 655, 689 (“Because some arbitration organizations impose filing and 
hearing fees that exceed typical court fees, consumers sometimes contend that the arbitration clause is 
unconscionable because it imposes an unreasonable financial burden and effectively denies them an 
affordable forum.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (2006) (providing provision for recovery of 
attorneys' fees and costs for prevailing plaintiffs in litigation). 
 154. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer 
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 64-65 (noting that one study 
found median verdict from jury is $264,700 and mean verdict from jury is $703,600, while arbitration 
garners median award of $49,400 and mean award of $124,500). 
 155. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 156. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text. 
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trable. Presumably, any money saved by manufacturers and warrantors via arbitra-
tion will be allocated to research, production, and product improvement, indirectly 
returning it to consumers. While consumers will theoretically suffer little to no 
injury, the integrity of arbitration will be preserved, promoting both domestic and 
international wealth creation.157 Additionally, while allowing MMWA claims to 
be arbitrated hinders the purpose of the Act, it does not cripple it, as the MMWA 
would continue to be a viable weapon for consumers.158 Skeptics may argue that 
manufacturers or warrantors will simply pocket any money saved and consumers 
truly will be aggrieved. To paraphrase Yogi Berra: in theory, theory and practice 
are the same thing, but in practice, they are not.  
2. Attempted Solutions 
In 1998, the American Arbitration Association acknowledged the difficulty in 
resolving this schism by promulgating a new protocol for arbitration of consumer 
contracts.159 The protocol advocated greater disclosure of the presence and terms 
of arbitration agreements, notice of the opportunity to use small claims court as an 
alternative to arbitration, and the use of clearer contractual statements alerting 
consumers that they are submitting to arbitration.160 While these efforts were 
commendable, they garnered little judicial support and have failed to materially 
impact merchant-consumer interactions.161  
Another suggested solution is to force merchants and warrantors to advertise 
their arbitration agreements along with any advertisements they make for their 
warranties.162 Greater exposure to arbitration agreements may help consumers 
educate themselves on the arbitral process before being confronted with a take-it-
or-leave-it sales contract. However, this solution may have little effect as many 
such warnings have devolved into bouts of jargon being hurled at lay consum-
ers.163 
Congress has also made efforts to solve the issue it helped create. In 2009, 
committee hearings were held nine separate times to decide the fate of the Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act, which would have amended the FAA by adopting pre-
dispute/post-dispute distinctions and barring all pre-dispute consumer arbitration 
agreements.164 The bill never gained the support it needed as it was resubmitted 
again in 2011 and once again failed.165 Should Congress pass such a bill, it would 
provide a clear answer to the McMahon and Chevron tests, vitiating any judicial 
 ___________________________  
 157. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. 
 158. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
 159. See American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol, 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014 (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
 160. See id. 
 161. Guerin, supra note 4, at 33 (“As demonstrated by the case law above, currently, the only state 
that is avidly pursuing the consumer contract arbitration issue is Alabama. Skeptically, one would 
assume that more than a protocol is needed to effect any change in industry.”). 
 162. Id. at 34. 
 163. Id.  
 164. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill was introduced on February 12, 2009, by Representa-
tive Henry Johnson and referred to the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law on 
March 16, 2009.  Previous identical bills died on the table. See S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 
3010, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 165. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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difficulties. However, this could expose policy pitfalls articulated by those favor-
ing arbitration of MMWA claims.166  
Eventual resolution of this problem may require a Supreme Court decision, 
which would presumably provide the final word on the MMWA’s statutory inter-
pretation. The Court may be motivated to take the issue up now that Kolev has 
created a split between the circuits.167 Given the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration 
stance, Congress’ apparent intent to allow arbitration of MMWA claims, and a 
current lack of uniformity in the law, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari 
and overrule Kolev.168 However, assuming that the Court does not preside over the 
issue, it is useful to evaluate the effect Kolev may have going forward. 
3. The Current Impact of Kolev 
While definitive resolution of the Kolev issue may one day be delivered, that 
day has not yet come. Given the labyrinthine difficulty of the case and the Ninth 
Circuit’s potential to address this issue again, it is worth examining what Kolev’s 
impact on contemporaneous jurisprudence may have been. If Kolev stands as 
precedent, it may serve as a circumvention of the Concepcion decision allowing 
for class action waivers.169 While the Ninth Circuit did not address class action 
waivers in Kolev, plaintiffs may begin to bring claims of MMWA infringement to 
avoid arbitral proceedings where class action waivers would be valid, and pursue 
litigation where such waivers would be invalid.170 Additionally, Kolev’s interpre-
tation of the MMWA could have a profound effect on products liability cases as 
many warrantors will have to plan ahead for litigation as opposed to an arbitral 
proceeding, which is often set up to advantage the warrantor.171  
The decision in Kolev evinces the Ninth Circuit’s continued preference favor-
ing consumers and litigation over enforcement of the FAA.172 Although Kolev will 
likely have a substantial impact in the Ninth Circuit, it is doubtful that impact will 
 ___________________________  
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much to be desired”). 
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affect courts outside that jurisdiction as the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly delivered 
arbitration opinions disfavored by the Supreme Court.173 If Kolev is not followed 
by other courts, it does not necessarily mean that the MMWA would perish along 
with it. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as other courts, have held that 
while those bringing claims under the MMWA may be forced to arbitrate, they 
will only be forced to do so if the arbitration agreement was disclosed in the writ-
ten warranty.174 This is significant because arbitration clauses are rarely placed in 
the written warranty, often allowing those claims to be litigated.175 So while Kolev 
may eventually be scrapped, the MMWA will remain a relevant, albeit redacted, 
part of warranty claims. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The problem faced in Kolev is a complex one that has troubled Congress, 
courts, and commentators, and no consensus has yet been reached. This issue may 
be attributed to poor legislative drafting, misguided administrative regulations, or 
lack of clear judicial precedent. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that Kolev has 
failed to make an impact; it has reopened the issue of MMWA arbitrability that 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits seemed to have settled, potentially ripening the 
issue for the Supreme Court.176 If the issue is not resolved by the Supreme Court 
or a subsequent Ninth Circuit decision, legislators and commentators will likely 
continue to lobby their perspectives while warrantors will need to be wary of their 
warranty agreements and jurisdictional differences among courts. Ultimately, the 
intersection between the MMWA and FAA remains in limbo and Kolev’s with-
drawal illustrates the ever-changing approach to that issue. Therefore, attorneys, 
courts, warrantors, and consumers should be advised to stay current on these de-
velopments as they continue to form the legal backdrop against which standard 
form warranties are written and consumer claims are handled. 
TYLER BECKERLE 
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